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Intergovernmental fiscal relations in developing countries. 
A review of issues 
 
Odd-Helge Fjeldstad*  
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Fiscal decentralisation - the devolution of taxing and spending powers to lower levels of 
government - has become an important theme of governance in many developing countries in 
recent years. Accordingly, restructuring of governmental functions and finances between the 
national and lower levels of government has entered the core of the development debate. A 
general conclusion emerging from this review of theoretical and empirical literature on 
intergovernmental fiscal relations is that sub-national governments need to be given access to 
adequate resources to do the job with which they are entrusted. At the same time they must also 
be accountable for what they do with these resources. Moreover, like all public policies, 
intergovernmental fiscal policies must take into account both the political constraints facing 
policy makers, such as the strength of different provinces and groups in political decisions, and 
economic constraints such as the stage of development of financial markets.  
 
 
1 Introduction  
Most countries have several tiers of government. In addition to the national level, many 
countries have two sub-national levels; i.e. provincial (or regional) and local governments (see 
table 1). Furthermore, local authorities are often divided into sub-levels such as ward and village 
councils. In many countries the lower levels of government undertake important fiscal functions, 
both on the expenditure side and with respect to revenues (Boadway et al., 2000). In such 
federal systems various forms of fiscal arrangements between the national and lower levels 
determine the way in which taxes are allocated and shared among the various levels of 
government, and how funds are transferred from one level to another. Thus, intergovernmental 
relations, both vertical (between levels of government) and horizontal (within levels) are 
important for the development and operation of an efficient and effective public sector. 
According to Bird (1990:281), it is the ‘workings of the myriad of intergovernmental relations 
that constitute the essence of the public sector in all countries’.  
 
The way intergovernmental fiscal systems are organised varies from country to country. These 
differences partly reflect historical and geographical characteristics of each country, the degree 
of heterogeneity of the population and the extent of government intervention in the economy. 
Given this diversity, how questions of inter-governmental structures and functions are resolved 
in practice will often differ from country to country (Bird, 1990). Although the diversity 
complicates broad generalisation, reference to the experiences of other countries is often the 
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only guide available. Despite its limitations, such experience may provide useful lessons in 
assessing the potential strengths and weaknesses of intergovernmental fiscal systems in any 
country (Bird & Vaillancourt 1998).  
 
This paper addresses some of the key issues and concepts that are of general relevance with 
respect to intergovernmental fiscal relations. Based on the experiences of a number of countries 
it attempts to derive some basic principles and considerations that should be taken into account 
when restructuring governmental functions and finances in a federal economy. In doing so, I 
draw on the growing literature on intergovernmental fiscal relations.1 Much of this literature 
refers to the experiences of industrialised countries where federal fiscal arrangements have 
evolved over a long period of time. However, fiscal decentralisation - the devolution of taxing 
and spending powers to lower levels of government - has also become an important theme of 
governance in many developing countries in recent years (Fukasaku and de Mello, 1999; Manor, 
1999; Crook and Manor, 1998). Accordingly, restructuring of governmental functions and 
finances between the national and lower levels of government has entered the core of the 
development debate.  
 
The article is organised around four questions that must be answered with respect to 
intergovernmental functions and finances in any country:2 
 
(1) Who does what? This question is about assignment of functions between levels of 
government.  
(2) Who levies what taxes? This question is about revenue assignment. 
(3) How to resolve the imbalance between the revenues and expenditures of sub-national 
governments? This question has to do with vertical imbalances between levels of 
government. 
(4) How to adjust for the differences in capacities and needs among different 
governmental units at the same level of government? This question is about 
horizontal imbalances or equalisation. 
 
2 Who does what? Assignment of functions between levels of government 
A key issue in intergovernmental fiscal relations is the assignment of functions and finances to 
different levels of government. This can also be described as the allocation of the authority and 
responsibility for the public sector decisions among different power centres. The traditional 
theory of fiscal federalism identifies three major functions for the public sector: macroeconomic 
stabilisation, income distribution and resource allocation (Oates, 1972 and 1999). The theory 
assigns the stabilisation and redistribution functions to the national government, while it assigns 
a significant role to sub-national governments in allocating resources. Let us briefly discuss the 
basic arguments behind this reasoning. 
 
2.1 Macroeconomic stabilisation  
The two main instruments of macroeconomic policy are monetary policy and fiscal policy. 
Fiscal policy, i.e., control over the amount and structure of taxes and expenditures, and the 
management of the budget deficit or surplus, is a powerful instrument for stabilising the 
economy. The stabilisation function is usually considered to be inherently national in nature, 
partly because sub-national authorities have few or no incentives to undertake economic 
                                                 
1 Classic references include Oates (1972) and Breton & Scott (1978). More recent surveys are Boadway et al., 
(2000); Oates (1999); Shah (1998); and Tanzi (2000).  
2 Bird & Vaillancourt (1998:15) characterise these as the four ‘big questions’ with respect to intergovernmental 
fiscal relations. 
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stabilisation polices. Furthermore, lower levels of government often lack the necessary 
macroeconomic instruments to carry out such policies. 
 
Since lower levels of government often are very dependent on the national government for 
finance, it sometimes makes more sense to think of them as part of the national government 
rather than as independent actors. However, in some federal countries where a substantial share 
of national revenues are diverted to lower-levels, the existence of several tiers of government 
may give rise to difficulties in macro-economic management (Bird, 1990). Thus, Prud’homme 
(1995) argues that a decentralised fiscal system may make macroeconomic policies more 
difficult to implement.  
 
 
Table 1 The structure of sub-national governments in selected countries 
 
Country Intermediate Local 
Argentina 23 provinces 1617 municipios 
Brazil 27 states  4 974 municipios 
Colombia 32 departments  1 068 municipalities 
Ethiopia 9 regions, plus 2 city 
adm., 66 zones 
550 woredas 
France 22 regions,  
96 departments 
36 772 communes 
India 25 states, 
7 union territories 
3 586 urban local bodies 
234 078 rural local bodies 
Italy 22 regions 
93 provinces 
8 100 municipalities 
Kenya 39 county councils  52 municipal, town and urban councils  
Malaysia 13 states  143 city, municipal and district 
councils  
Mozambique 10 provinces 33 municipalities 
Philippines 76 provinces 64 cities 
1541 municipalities 
41924 barangayas 
South Africa 9 provinces 850 local authorities 
Tanzania 21 regions (incl. 
Zanzibar) 
92 district councils,  
18 municipal and town councils, 
1 city council (Dar es Salaam) 
Uganda 45 districts, 
13 municipalities 
950 sub-counties, 
39 municipal divisions, 
51 town councils  
United Kingdom Counties 540 rural districts, metropolitan 
districts and London boroughs 
 
United States  50 states  39000 counties and municipalities 
44000 special-purpose local authorities 
 
Sources: World Bank (2000) and Fjeldstad & Semboja (2000) based on data from 1997 and 1998. 
 
 
 
Argentina during the 1980s illustrates what is sometimes referred to as ‘fiscal perversity’ of sub-
national governments (Prud’homme, 1995). In 1986 provincial expenditures rose rapidly to 
more than 11.2 % of GDP, while the provincial government revenues dropped to 5 % of GDP. 
The 6.2 % deficit was either financed by transfers from the central government or by borrowing, 
which both were inflationary. Furthermore, because the grants were not financed by central 
government revenues, the practice led to government deficits of a large magnitude. This 
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situation, combined with extensive borrowing by the provincial governments from the Central 
Bank or from banks controlled by the provincial governments, contributed to unsustainable 
public sector fiscal deficits that undermined ‘national efforts to attain price stability and to 
promote sustainable economic development’ (World Bank, 1990:ii).  
 
In contrast, studies from other countries, including the United States and Western Europe, 
conclude that decentralisation has not undermined stability (World Bank, 2000). Findings from 
Canada even suggest that the growth of sub-national budgets has had a stabilising effect on the 
economy (Sewell, 1996). This is explained by the observation that the major expenditure 
responsibilities which often are assigned to larger sub-national governments – such as public 
funding of health and education – act as automatic stabilisers because they are recurrent and not 
very flexible. Increased reliance on direct taxes, such as personal income taxes in sub-national 
financing in some countries has also been found to have stabilising effects.  
 
2.2 Income distribution 
A substantial share of the public finance literature holds that the redistribution of income is 
primarily a national government concern. Some scholars even argue that attempts by local 
governments to redress income differences are likely to be unfair (Prud’homme, 1995). 
Moreover, it is sometimes argued that decentralised income-distribution is self-defeating. For 
instance, if a jurisdiction adopts policies to redistribute income by imposing high taxes on the 
rich and giving high benefits to the poor, the rich will tend to ‘vote with their feet’ and leave for 
more lightly taxed areas, and the poor will move in from areas that tend to offer lower benefits.   
 
However, in practice redistributive policies is often carried out at decentralised levels of 
government, too. For instance, some regulatory policies allocated to local authorities in many 
countries, such as land use and rent controls, have profound distributional implications. Public 
health care, primary education, water supply, housing and public transportation which are 
assigned to sub-national levels in many countries, also have important re-distributional functions 
(Sewell, 1996). In poorer countries such services are often the only tool for providing in-kind 
transfers to poorer households. The relatively large size of local governments in the 
Scandinavian countries is explained in part by their responsibilities for income distribution. In 
Denmark, for instance, where local authorities account for more than half of total government 
expenditures and about a third of gross national product, social security and welfare account for 
more than half of local government budgets.   
 
2.3 Resource allocation 
The fiscal federalist model assigns a significant role to sub-national governments in allocating 
resources. The classic argument provided by the theory of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972) is that 
in a democratic society decentralisation will result in a better match of supply and demand for 
local public goods. Being closer to the people, it is claimed, local authorities can more easily 
identify people’s needs, and thus supply the appropriate form and level of public services 
(Enemuo, 2000; Rondinelli et al., 1989). Some scholars within the public choice school, also 
argue that decentralisation tends to increase healthy competition among jurisdictions (Brennan 
and Buchanan, 1980; Breton, 1989).  
 
However, these theoretical arguments face several practical obstacles. Prud’homme (1995), for 
instance, questions the relevance of the assumptions of the model of fiscal federalism for 
developing countries. He puts forward three main arguments to support his critique: Firstly, in 
most developing countries the problem is not to reveal fine differences in tastes and preferences 
between jurisdictions, but to satisfy basic needs. Secondly, the model of fiscal federalism 
assumes that the taxpayers (or voters) of each jurisdiction will express their preferences in their 
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votes. However, in many developing countries where land and labour markets do not function 
well and democratic tradition is in its infancy, it is not realistic to assume that people can move 
easily between jurisdictions or make their voices heard through the political process. Thus, 
according to Prud’homme (p. 208), the menus offered for choice are unlikely to express the 
electorate’s preferences. Finally, even if elected officials wanted to fulfil their mandate from 
their voters, they can not because of a gross mismatch between available resources and promised 
expenditures. Therefore, elected officials often lack incentives to keep their promises. And even 
if they did and had sufficient resources to do so, it is not obvious that they would be able to 
persuade the local bureaucracy to go along. Local government bureaucrats in many developing 
countries are, he argues, often unresponsive, poorly motivated and occasionally poorly qualified, 
and they might have good reasons to pursue their own agenda rather than the agenda of their 
superiors. This argument is supported by the general observation that central governments 
bureaucracies are likely to attract more qualified people, partly because they can offer higher 
salaries, and partly because they can offer better careers, with a greater diversity of tasks, more 
possibilities for promotion, and a longer view of issues.  
 
To summarise this discussion, assignment of functions between levels of government is 
complex. In many countries this has opened up for responsibility-sharing between the national 
government and sub-national jurisdictions. However, without transparency and an appropriate 
regulatory framework, there can be no accountability. South Africa in the late 1990s provides an 
illustrative example: The national government and the provinces have joint responsibilities for 
health and education, but the exact responsibilities of each are not defined (World Bank, 2000). 
The result is that provinces receive transfers to fund these services but may use them for other 
purposes, knowing well that the national government will intervene to provide the needed 
service.  
 
3 Who levies what taxes? 
Governments rely on a wide variety of tax instruments for their revenue needs, including direct 
and indirect taxes, general and specific taxes, business and individual taxes. In this section we 
address the question on which types of taxes are most suitable for the various levels of 
government. There is no ideal assignment of taxes between central and lower levels of 
government. However, a set of ‘tax-assignment rules’ has been developed in the traditional 
fiscal federalism theory. These principles relate to the respective responsibilities of central and 
lower tiers of government in macroeconomic stabilisation, income redistribution and resource 
allocation (Boadway et al., 2000). Furthermore, in developing countries the administrative 
capabilities of local governments in tax design (i.e., deciding on revenue bases and setting rates) 
must be taken into consideration (Bird, 1990). Moreover, in large and diverse countries the issue 
of tax harmonisation between jurisdictions is important when assigning taxing powers.  
 
The stabilisation objective of the fiscal system calls for central control over the tax instruments 
that may substantially influence central budget deficits or inflation. Thus, taxes on international 
transactions (customs duties) and a considerable share of income and general sales taxes (such 
as VAT) should be assigned to central government. Moreover, the distributive function of 
government is an argument for centralised corporate income and wealth taxes. If there are wide 
disparities in income and wealth across provinces, as there are in many developing countries, 
then local taxing powers may exacerbate these differences. However, since the central 
government can borrow money to make up for shortfalls, it can live with the more unstable 
revenue sources. Local governments, by contrast, require relatively stable sources of revenue. 
Following Musgrave (1983 and 2000), these assignment rules yield the following six general 
principles of tax assignment in a federation: 
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1) taxes suitable for economic stabilisation should be levied by the central government; 
lower- level taxes should be cyclically stable; 
2) progressive re-distributional taxes should be assigned to central government; 
3) personal taxes with progressive rates should be levied by the jurisdictions most 
capable of implementing a tax on a global base; 
4) lower- level governments should tax revenue bases with low mobility between 
jurisdictions; 
5) tax bases distributed highly unequally between jurisdictions should be centralised; 
and  
6) benefit taxes and user charges may be appropriately used at all levels. 
 
These six principles produce in combination the specific assignment of categories of tax 
instruments that are presented in table 2. 
 
 
Table 2 Tax assignments: who should tax what? 
 
Determination of Comments  Tax type  
tax base tax rate  
Collection and 
Administration   
Customs  N N N International trade taxes 
Corporate income N N N Mobile factor 
Personal income N N,P,L N Redistributive, mobility, 
stabilisation 
Wealth taxes (incl. 
capital, inheritances) 
N N,P N Redistributive 
Payroll N,P N,P N,P Social programme 
Value-added tax N N N Admin.costs, stabilisation 
Resource taxes:     
    Rent (profit) tax N N N Unequally distributed 
    Royalties/fees P,L P,L P,L Benefit taxes 
Conservation charges  P,L P,L P,L Environmental preservation 
‘Sin’ taxes:     
    Alcohol, tobacco N,P N,P N,P Health care shared 
    Gambling, betting P,L P,L P,L Province and local 
responsibility 
    Lotteries P,L P,L P,L Province and local 
responsibility 
Taxation of ‘bads’:     
    Carbon N N N Global/national pollution 
    Motor fuels  N,P,L N,P,L N,P,L Tolls on road use 
    Congestion tolls  N,P,L N,P,L N,P,L Tolls on road use 
    Parking fees L L L Local congestion 
Motor vehicles:     
    Registration P P P Provincial revenue source 
    Driver’s licences P P P Provincial revenue source 
Business taxes P P P Benefit tax 
Excises P P P Immobile tax base 
Property tax P L L Benefit tax, immobile 
Land tax P L L Benefit tax, immobile 
User charges N,P,L N,P,L N,P,L Payment for services 
 
N=national (or central); P=province (or region); L=local 
 
Source: Boadway et al. (2000) 
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While the general principles and theoretical discussions of tax assignments are useful, in 
practice, country-specific factors play a large role (Tanzi, 2000). In many countries local 
governments raise whatever taxes they are capable of raising, often without worrying 
excessively about the economic distortions and distribution effects that these taxes may create. 
For instance, a widely found characteristic of local government revenue systems in Africa is the 
huge number of revenue instruments in use (Brosio, 2000). Tanzania provides a good case. It is 
not uncommon that local authorities have more than 50 different taxes and fees, not including 
the various sub-groups of particular revenue bases. In one council studied by Fjeldstad & 
Semboja (2000), the by-law on hawking and street trading specifies in detail 38 different 
components (including licences for bicycle repairs, tyre puncture repairs, shoe shiner, car wash, 
carpenter, firewood, potato chips seller, etc.). Furthermore, there are often large variations on 
the tax rates imposed by councils on similar revenue bases, for instance on agricultural products. 
This has led to extensive ‘smuggling’ of agricultural goods across council boundaries. The 
complex revenue structure is due to the large tax autonomy of local authorities that may pass by-
laws without serious approval by the ministry concerned. Lack of co-ordination between the 
central and local levels has led to duplication of taxes and inconsistencies between taxes 
imposed by local authorities and the national government’s development policies (e.g., with 
respect to export promotion). An illustrative example is the cess rate on cashew nuts, a major 
export crop, which in 1997 represented 20 percent of the price paid to producers in Kibaha 
district council, creating huge disincentives for export production.  
 
To summarise the discussion in this section, there is no ‘ideal’ way of dividing taxing 
responsibility between central and lower tiers of government. The case for centralisation is 
usually built around macroeconomic considerations and equalisation, and the case for local 
government taxing powers on efficiency considerations. The ‘optimal’ way to do things, 
however, depends on how the government weights these considerations (Bahl & Wallich, 1992). 
Furthermore, the capacity to administer taxes is always an important constraint to the 
assignment of taxing powers to lower levels of government in developing countries. If local 
governments cannot effectively assess and collect the taxes, then the system will tend toward 
centralisation. 
 
3.1 Cost recovery through user charges 
Taxes are not the best mechanism to obtain a better relation between demand and supply of 
public services. Better links can be achieved through cost-recovery charging systems. Moreover, 
user charges may contribute to simplifying many of the present intergovernmental problems, 
partly because user charges are applicable at all levels of government  (Bennett, 1990). In some 
countries, including South Africa, charges on trading services such as electricity, water, 
sanitation and solid waste, are the major sources of urban and metropolitan revenues.  
 
In principle, user charges tie the amount paid directly to the amount of a service a consumer 
uses. Thus, responsiveness to customers may be achieved through cost recovery mechanisms. 
User charges can also reflect differences in ability to pay by incorporating sliding scales for type 
of user or amount of usage (Rondinelli et al., 1989), although this will require adequate 
administrative capacity. Accordingly, user charges may have the potential of:3 
 
· improving resource allocation; 
· controlling the possibility of ‘crowding out’ by imposing a uniform basis for competition 
which allows alternative suppliers in the non-governmental area to survive and develop; 
                                                 
3 Bennett (1990) and Jimenez (1987) provide interesting insights on the potential role of user charges in improving 
service delivery.  
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· stimulating a closer response of service producers to customer demands which in turn should 
raise quality and remove unnecessary production; and 
· improving social equity and environmental policy by incorporating the social costs of 
externalities.  
 
There are obviously a number of constraints on user charges and other means of cost recovery in 
developing countries. These arise from equity considerations, fluctuations in demand, and the 
relations between services financed by charges and private sector provision compared to those 
financed by general tax revenues. For instance, the central government may not have enough 
information about the structure and effects of most types of user charges across sub-national 
jurisdictions. Therefore, it is often difficult for the central level to determine if the current 
structure is appropriate for balancing efficiency and equity objectives. Furthermore, local 
governments may employ user charges as taxes to fund general expenses, and thereby 
undermine the relationship between demand and supply of public services. However, 
governments as well as the public opinion have too readily seen general revenue, particularly tax 
revenue, as the ‘normal’ financial source. It has been the easy way out of difficult decisions, 
illustrated by the large and increasing number of taxes. This suggests that there are reasons and 
scope for innovation, including greater use of mechanisms of exchange based on realistic 
pricing and other cost-recovery methods. 
 
4 How to resolve vertical imbalances?  
The general nature of intergovernmental fiscal relations is surprisingly similar across a wide 
range of countries. Almost without exception countries assign more expenditure functions to 
sub-national governments than can be financed from the revenue sources allocated to those 
governments. The result of this mismatching of functions and finances – often referred to as 
‘vertical imbalances’ - is that sub-national governments are generally dependent upon transfers 
from higher levels of government. Thus, Bird (1990) argues that ‘money is at the heart of 
intergovernmental matters’. Table 3 illustrates this point.  
 
 
Table 3 Vertical imbalances in selected countries 
 
Vertical imbalances 
Share of sub-national government (%) 
In total public expenditure In total tax revenue 
 
 
 
Country 
1990 1997 1990 1997 
Argentina 46.3 43.9 38.2 41.1 
Brazil 35.3 36.5 30.9 31.3 
Ethiopia 1.5 .. 1.6 .. 
France 18.7 18.6 9.7 10.8 
India 51.1 53.3 33.8 36.1 
Italy 22.8 25.4 3.6 6.5 
Kenya 4.4 3.5 2.2 1.9 
Malaysia 20.2 19.1 3.7 2.4 
Philippines 6.5 .. 4.0 .. 
South Africa 20.7 49.8 5.5 5.3 
United Kingdom 29.0 27.0 5.9 3.6 
United States  42.0 46.4 33.8 32.9 
 
Source: World Bank (2000) 
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Vertical fiscal imbalance exists in all the selected countries because none of their lower level 
government systems raises sufficient revenue to match expenditure responsibilities. However, 
table 3 reveals considerable variations between countries with respect to the degree of vertical 
fiscal imbalances. The sub-national jurisdictions in Argentina, Brazil, the United States and 
India come closest to achieving fiscal balance. The gap between expenditure and revenue (in 
1997) is the greatest for South Africa, Malaysia, Italy and the United Kingdom. Lower levels of 
government in these countries are therefore especially dependent on transfers from the central 
government. Furthermore, the table shows that Argentina has the least centralised tax system 
with respect to share in national tax-raising, while Kenya, Malaysia, the United Kingdom and 
South Africa are the most centralised. 
 
The basic rationale for a system of transfers is the existence of a fiscal gap at the local 
government level arising out of own-revenue and own-expenditure assignments. There are a 
number of methods to close the fiscal imbalances of sub-national governments, some of which 
also reduce imbalances between jurisdictions (Ahmad, 1997:6). In practice, we may distinguish 
between systems of revenue sharing and grants. 
 
4.1 Revenue sharing  
The most revenue generating tax bases according to the ‘assignment rules’ outlined above, 
belong to the central government. Based on these considerations the central government should 
keep the major taxes, especially the corporate income tax, multistage taxes such as the VAT, 
and taxes on foreign trade. Thus, if the sole concern of the central government is simply to fill a 
vertical fiscal gap one way would be to give lower levels of government a share of major 
national taxes collected in the area. Sub-national governments may assist in revenue 
mobilisation by providing information on local taxpayers, and thereby increasing the pool of tax 
revenues.  
 
Tax revenues can be shared on a tax-by-tax basis or on the entire pool of central government tax 
revenues. Examples of the first kind are quite common, and exist in Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, 
Russia and in other countries (Tanzi, 2000). In Argentina, for instance, the national government 
collects income tax, VAT, excise taxes, customs duties, energy taxes, social security taxes and 
some minor taxes. Some of these taxes, including VAT, the income tax and excise taxes, are 
subject to fairly complicated sharing arrangements with sub-national jurisdictions. In principle, 
the distribution of shared revenues among sub-national governments are made on a derivation 
basis, with each jurisdiction getting the same share of the revenue collected in its area.  
 
One problem with the tax-by-tax sharing arrangement is that it may give the central government 
an incentive to concentrate its collection and enforcement efforts on the taxes that are either not 
shared or shared to a lesser degree (Ahmad, 1997). Furthermore, the central government may 
have an incentive to concentrate increases in rates (for instance for stabilisation purposes) on the 
shared taxes, something that may distort the tax system. Therefore, revenue sharing based on the 
entire pool of government revenues may be preferable. Revenue sharing, which transfers a 
portion of the national proceeds of a tax according to a predetermined formula, is much like a 
general-purpose unconditional block grant. However, this does not address the problem of 
horizontal imbalances, i.e., between jurisdictions within the same level. Sub-national 
governments’ autonomy over revenue bases and rate structures are also sacrificed.  
 
Furthermore, revenue sharing arrangements may have both pro- and contra-cyclical effects. For 
instance, if the central government tries to tighten fiscal policy by raising shared taxes, this 
move will also give the provincial or local governments more resources for spending. This 
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outcome may be avoided if the portion of revenue going to the sub-national governments is 
levied at a constant rate on the shared tax base. Fixed revenue-sharing arrangements may also 
have pro-cyclical effects as tax revenue automatically rises during a boom, and thereby 
increases the spending capacity of the sub-national governments, while declining revenue during 
economic downturns forces them to cut back spending. To address this problem, some element 
of flexibility could be introduced in these sharing arrangements. For instance, this can be done 
by relating the transfers to a moving average of central government revenues or by requiring 
provincial or local governments to build up revenue stabilisation funds to even out cyclical 
fluctuations in shared taxes.  
 
4.2 Grants 
Besides revenue sharing, the main mechanism for intergovernmental transfers is grants from 
central to local governments. In principle, there are three broad categories of grants:4 
· Unconditional grants: These are general-purpose transfers aimed at addressing vertical 
imbalances. 
· Conditional grants: These grants carry conditions regarding the use of the funds. Sometimes 
the conditions are tied to the performance to be achieved in the programmes financed 
through them. 
· Equalisation grants: These are used to address horizontal imbalances between local 
authorities. The purpose of horizontal equalisation is to equalise the capacity of local 
governments to provide a ‘national standard’ level of public goods and services. The grants 
also have the effect of closing the vertical fiscal gap. 
 
A variety of unconditional (or general) grant systems are in use to determine the total amount to 
be distributed among sub-national governments. Brosio (2000) discusses various grant systems 
in use in Africa: Ghana, for instance, uses a system where no less than 5 % of total central 
government revenues are to be allocated to a ‘Common Fund’ for the disposal of sub-national 
governments. In Uganda, unconditional grants are determined annually with reference to the 
reassignment of tasks between the national and sub-national governments. According to the 
Ugandan Constitution, the total amount is calculated on the basis of a formula that includes the 
unconditional grant of the previous year, corrected by the increase in the general price level, 
plus the net change in the budgeted costs of running newly devolved or subtracted services. 
Thus, the Ugandan formula takes into account the actual devolution of functions and its 
budgetary implications. Ethiopia, in contrast, follows a less transparent system. When 
determining the size of the grant one starts with estimates of total resources available from tax 
and non-tax revenue and counterpart funds. However, direct foreign assistance, which is 
extensive in some jurisdictions, is not included. After negotiations with the regions, the national 
government allocates the total pool between itself and the regional governments. In 1995/96 a 
formula based system was introduced in Ethiopia. However, according to Brosio (2000) the 
formula has changed every year since its introduction.  
  
A key element in many ongoing decentralisation reforms in developing countries is the 
provision of conditional block grants from the centre to sub-national governments.  The 
conditionality refers to earmarking the financing to certain broad-based services, such as 
primary education, primary health, water supply, agricultural extension and roads. The grants 
are often based on minimum standards of service to be defined by the sector ministries in 
negotiation with representatives of sub-national governments. These grants usually relate to 
recurrent costs only. Such earmarking of grants will of course limit the autonomy of sub-
national jurisdictions, and thereby partly negating the arguments for decentralisation (Wolman, 
                                                 
4 Ahmad (1997) provides a thorough and readable ‘state-of-the-art’ study on grants. 
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1990). However, imposing conditions may be justified by distributional considerations, such as 
the need to ensure minimum nation-wide standards for the provision of services of national 
concern. Thus, to even out income among jurisdictions, a formula could be based on redistribute 
criteria which may combine population, income per capita, indicators of backwardness, etc.. 
 
Other public services than the major nationally defined ones discussed above, are often funded 
by unconditional block grants. These services may include district culture, community 
development, natural resources. As unconditional grants there are no minimum standards of 
service defined nor any performance indicators. Therefore, these grants may be used at the 
discretion of sub-national level of government to provide services in line with the objectives of 
the area, and will be accounted for through the individual jurisdiction’s accounting system.  
 
Two factors seem to be critical to ensuring the effectiveness of the block grant system. These are 
(1) accountability, and (2) predictability. Regarding accountability, financial management and 
control of the recurrent grants suffer from several weaknesses in many developing countries. 
These often relate to the absence of internal audit sections, poor reporting systems and non-
compliance with established financial regulation. Semboja (1999) reports from Tanzania that 
some local authorities divert large shares of the grants disbursed for the education and health 
sectors to other issues. Regarding predictability, sub-national governments often experience 
delays and irregularities in the receipt of grants. According to Semboja (1999), local councils in 
Tanzania, in general, receive less than the budgeted charges approved by the Parliament. For 
instance, during the five months period October 1998 to February 1999, Kisarawe district 
council received only 45 % of the approved budget. The corresponding figure for Dar es Salaam 
city council was 66 %. Predictability is further weakened since there is no objective criterion for 
determining the level of charges disbursed to the various councils.   
 
Thus, experiences indicate that it may be problematic in practice to design and enforce 
appropriate conditions for grants. Without substantial capacity building in financial management 
and monitoring, controls may end up being more formal than substantive, opening up for 
mismanagement and corruption. It may even become more difficult to specify and enforce 
conditionality on the performance of the sectors supported by the block grants.  
 
4.3 Macroeconomic aspects of fiscal decentralisation 
Promoting fiscal responsibility at sub-national levels calls for implementation of a stable and 
transparent system of transfers, geared to filling any gap between the assigned spending and 
revenue-raising responsibilities of lower level governments (Ter-Minassian, 1999). The 
definition of such a system is far from easy, especially given the need to preserve adequate 
incentives for tax effort and cost effectiveness in spending by the sub-national governments. 
However, in the process of fiscal decentralisation it is important to be aware of the risks for 
macroeconomic management and fiscal discipline. Mechanisms of fiscal transfers may impose 
considerably rigidity to the central government budget. Therefore, substantial devolution of 
revenues and spending responsibilities to sub-national jurisdictions can affect the central 
government’s ability to carry out stabilisation and macroeconomic adjustment through the 
budget.  
 
The destabilising potential of sub-national governments’ is greatest when they face no hard 
budget constraint (Ter-Minassian, 1999; World Bank, 2000). Expectations of bail-out in case of 
financial trouble weaken the incentives to economise on costs, and may generate resource waste 
and rigidity within local authorities. These inefficiencies, in turn, may spill over into macro-
economic imbalances. In particular, concern for macro economic imbalance lies behind the 
common recommendation that strict limits should be imposed on the borrowing ability of sub-
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national jurisdictions (Bird & Vaillancourt, 1998). It is feared that sub-national governments 
that are highly dependent on national transfers, may increase their current expenditures above 
their capacity to fund them out of current revenues and then close the gap through borrowing. 
For instance, in Mexico provincial borrowing contributed in the mid-1990s to a situation where 
some states were defined as ‘bankrupt’ (Tanzi, 2000).  
 
Short-run macro-economic management considerations call for effective limits on sub-national 
governments’ deficits, consistent with national objectives for growth, inflation and balance of 
payments. To ensure a regular and frequent dialogue between the central government and 
provincial and local authorities on budget trends, institutional forums, such as the South African 
‘Financial and Fiscal Commission’, may play an important role.  
 
Stability and transparency considerations call for formula-based revenue-sharing and other 
transfer systems. Thus, many developing countries are currently shifting from totally 
discretionary methods to formula-base systems of allocation from the centre to sub-national 
governments. For example, South Africa introduced in 1998/99 a formula-based system of 
allocation was introduced which also includes an equalisation component. However, according 
to Brosio (2000), the main problems in many African countries at present appear to be: (i) 
frequent changes in the allocation formula; (ii) use of variables reflecting discretionary policy 
choices made by the recipient sub-national governments; (iii) little attention paid to equalisation; 
and (iv) few incentives to increase own revenue generation by lower level governments. 
Therefore, the South African system deserves further attention since it has made important 
improvements in terms of transparency and efficiency in the allocation of resources from the 
centre to the provincial level.  
 
5 How to resolve horizontal imbalances? 
The problem of ‘horizontal balance’ has to do with the fact that geographical areas usually differ 
with respect to resource capacity and needs. For instance, the taxbase per capita often differ 
substantially between urban municipalities and district councils. Furthermore, the needs for 
public services may differ because some areas, for example, have a higher percentage of school 
children and/or elderly people than others (Wolman, 1990). Designing fiscal institutions to cope 
with this complex reality is often problematic, and may be further exacerbated by political 
imperatives of treating even the most unequal jurisdictions uniformly, and by historically rooted 
conflicts and rivalries between regions and population groups (Bird, 1990).  
 
Whether fiscal decentralisation aggravates income differences among sub-national jurisdictions 
or becomes a positive force in efforts to alleviate poverty depends on two factors (World Bank, 
2000:110): The first is horizontal equity, which is the extent to which sub-national governments 
have the fiscal capacity to deliver an equivalent level of services to their population. The second 
can be described as within-state equity, which is the ability or willingness of sub-national 
governments to improve income distribution within their borders.  
 
Horizontal equity is connected to the question of equalisation grants. Tax bases usually vary 
substantially between provinces and between different local authorities. A jurisdiction with a 
relatively small tax base cannot compensate by imposing much higher tax rates without losing 
businesses and residents to jurisdictions with lower taxes. The costs of providing public services 
may also vary due to, for instance, population density and geographic location. To correct for 
such variations many countries have introduced equalisation grants. The purpose of these grants 
is to channel funds from relatively wealthy jurisdictions to poorer ones. Such transfers are often 
based on an equalisation formula that measures the ‘fiscal need’ and ‘fiscal capacity’ of each 
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province or local authority (Oates, 1999). The formula results in a disproportionate share of 
transfers going to the jurisdictions with the greatest fiscal need and the least fiscal capacity. One 
problem with equalisation grants, however, is that sub-national governments may differ in their 
willingness to raise taxes. Thus, the grants may create an incentive for sub-national authorities 
to understate their tax bases or relative wealth in order to maximise transfers from the national 
government. 
 
In many countries, however, income inequality is due to differences among individuals within a 
local authority or province rather than to differences among the local governments or provinces 
themselves. Therefore, by providing poorer provinces with additional resources will affect only 
one aspect of the equity problem. Ravallion (1999) reports that evidence from India and 
Indonesia shows that even dramatic redistribution across regions will have limited results unless 
targeting is improved within regions themselves. This, in turn, depends on the ability and 
willingness of the sub-national jurisdictions to engage in redistribution. 
 
A recent review of a social programme in Argentine, found that when reforms were introduced 
to improve the programme’s reach to the very poor, most of the improvements were due to 
reforms in intra-provincial targeting and better national monitoring of provincial performance 
(World Bank, 2000). Similarly, in Bolivia it was found that only when decentralisation gave 
communities more power to influence their local governments, the composition of local public 
expenditures shifted in favour of the poor.  
 
Success in targeting the poor requires therefore a combination of national and sub-national 
efforts. In general, the main responsibility for poverty alleviation and income distribution should 
remain at the central government level, partly to secure national standard level of public goods 
and services. However, provinces and local authorities can play important roles through the 
delivery and management of social services. Nonetheless, the central government needs to retain 
a monitoring role to ensure that redistribute goals are satisfied (World Bank, 2000:111).  
 
6 Concluding remarks 
A general conclusion emerging from this review of theoretical and empirical literature on inter-
governmental fiscal relations is that sub-national governments need to be given access to 
adequate resources to do the job with which they are entrusted. At the same time they must also 
be accountable for what they do with these resources.  
 
Another conclusion is that questions on how to organise intergovernmental fiscal systems 
should be approached in the specific circumstances of each country in a manner that is 
consistent with achieving the relevant policy objectives. These objectives include efficient 
allocation of resources, income distribution and macroeconomic stabilisation. Furthermore, they 
may include objectives such as achieving ‘regional balance’ in the country. Often, there will be 
conflicts not only between these objectives, but also between local and central perceptions on 
the weights to be attached to them. Moreover, like all public policies, intergovernmental fiscal 
policies must take into account both the political constraints facing policy makers, such as the 
strength of different provinces and groups in political decisions, and economic constraints such 
as the stage of development of financial markets (Bird & Vaillancourt 1998). Finally, all policy 
changes proposed must start from the given set of initial conditions: every country has a history, 
and the current state of its fiscal institutions in large part reflects the product of an evolutionary 
process of policy change over time. 
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Fiscal decentralisation - the devolution of taxing and spending
powers to lower levels of government - has become an
important theme of governance in many developing countries
in recent years. Accordingly, restructuring of governmental
functions and finances between the national and lower levels
of government has entered the core of the development debate.
A general conclusion emerging from this review of theoretical
and empirical literature on intergovernmental fiscal relations
is that sub-national governments need to be given access to
adequate resources to do the job with which they are entrusted.
At the same time they must also be accountable for what they
do with these resources. Moreover, like all public policies,
intergovernmental fiscal policies must take into account both
the political constraints facing policy makers, such as the
strength of different provinces and groups in political decisions,
and economic constraints such as the stage of development of
financial markets.
